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Abstract
Event Tree (ET) analysis is a widely used forward deductive safety analysis
technique for decision-making at a system design stage. Existing ET tools usually
provide Graphical Users Interfaces (GUI) for users to manually draw system level
ET diagrams, which consist of nodes and branches, describing all possible success
and failure scenarios. However, these tools do not include some important ET
analysis steps, e.g., the automatic generation and reduction of a complete system
ET diagram. In this paper, we present a new Event Trees Modeling and Analysis
(ETMA) tool to facilitate users to conduct a complete ET analysis of a given
system. Some key features of ETMA include: (i) automatic construction of a
complete ET model of real-world systems; (ii) deletion/reduction of unnecessary
ET nodes and branches; (iii) partitioning of ET paths; and (iv) probabilistic
analysis of the occurrence of a certain event. For illustration purposes, we utilize
our ETMA tool to conduct the ET analysis of a protective fault trip circuit
in power grid transmission lines. We also compared the ETMA results with
Isograph, which is well-known commercial tool for ET analysis.
Keywords— Event Tree, Modeling, Analysis, Python, Isograph, Power Grid
Transmission Lines.
1 Introduction
Nowadays, the fulfillment of stringent safety requirements for highly critical sys-
tems, which are prevalent, e.g., in smart grids and autonomous systems, has been
encouraging safety design engineers to utilize dependability analysis techniques as per
recommendations of the safety standards, such as IEC 61850 [1] and ISO 26262 [2].
Event Tree (ET) analysis is a well-known dependability analysis technique that
enumerates all possible combinations of component states and external events and
thus provides a detailed system view [3]. The building of a graphical diagram of
a system ET model starts with an initiating node and sequentially drawing all the
system components and their operating states [4]. In the ET analysis, the probabilistic
assessment of the occurrence of a certain event can be used for decision-making at the
systems design stage. The results of the ET analysis are extremely useful for safety
analysts to quantify systems improvement.
Existing commercially available ET tools, such as ITEM [5], Isograph [6], and EC
Tree [7], provide many powerful features, including user-friendly editors, a commonly
used events library and the coloring of diagram elements for easier viewing. For
instance, the EC Tree tool, which is developed by NASA’s IM&S (Integrated Modeling
and Simulation) Team, provides an Excel sheet for potential users. It can be easily
used to input a given system ET model with a little training. All these tools require a
system ET diagram from the user, which is then followed by assigning the probability
to each branch of an ET diagram. Prior to utilizing these tools for ET analysis, the
users must draw a given system ET diagram manually, may be on a paper. However,
this manual approach may introduce errors from the start since an ET diagram
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becomes significantly large as the number of system components and their operational
states increases. Moreover, an important feature of partitioning an ET with respect to
an event occurrence and then to calculate its corresponding probability is not available
in any existing ET analysis tools.
To overcome the above-mentioned limitations of existing ET tools, we develop a
new Event Trees Modeling and Analysis (ETMA) tool. It is mainly inspired from the
work of Papazoglou [8], who was among the first ones to describe the sound mathemat-
ical foundations of ET analysis during late 90’s. The development of ETMA starts
from a recursive function describing the pattern of generating an ET diagram from
the given list of all possible failure and success modes of given system components.
Most importantly, ETMA offers a reduction feature, which deletes unnecessary nodes
and branches from the automatically generated ET diagram and return an ET model
representing the actual behavior of a given system. ETMA has an intriguing feature
of partitioning the ET paths according to the system components failure and success
modes. It also provides the probabilistic analysis feature by allowing users to assign
the probability to each components states. Moreover, the ETMA results can be
used to identify critical components and make decisions about adding redundancy
in a system. All these ETMA features are developed in the Python programming
language [9], which offers extensive built-in libraries for displaying, list manipulations
and arithmetic calculations.
It is worth mentioning that our ETMA tool can handle large and complex real-
world systems with an arbitrary number of system components and their operating
states. For illustration purposes, we utilize ETMA to conduct the ET analysis of a
protective trip circuit in power grid transmission lines consisting of several critical
components, such as relays and current transformers[10].
Our main novel contributions in this paper are as follows:
• Automatic generation of complete system ET model from a given list of system
components and their operating states
• Deletion of unnecessary nodes and branches to generate a reduced ET model
• Partitioning of ET with respect to an event occurrence for probabilistic analysis
• Implementation in Python of a comprehensive tool for ET modeling and analysis:
ETMA
• Step-wise ET analysis of a protection fault trip circuit in power grid transmission
lines with a decision analysis to add redundancy for some critical components
• Comparison between the results of ETMA with the commercial Isograph ET
analysis software
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we briefly summarize the
fundamentals of ETs and the theoretical foundations of the ETMA tool. Section III
describes the ET modeling and analysis features of ETMA. Section IV presents the
step-wise process of ET analysis of a protective trip circuit in power grid transmission
lines using ETMA and the decision analysis of the trip circuit critical components
based on ETMA results. Section V provides a comparison between ETMA and the
Isograph software. Lastly, Section VI concludes the paper.
2 Event Trees
An ET diagram starts by a single initiating event called Node and then all pos-
sible outcomes of an event are drawn as branches. This process is continuously
repeated in the forward direction until all event nodes and their branches are drawn
resulting in a complete ET diagram of the system. Fig. 1 depicts a generic ET diagram.
Nodes model the occurrence of different possibilities for an event or modes
of operation of system components, which is known as event outcome space in
the literature [8]. A Node is usually represented by a circle with multiple line
segments. For instance, in Fig. 1, X, Y and Z are nodes. Branches originating
from a node represent each of the next possible component states. A Branch is
usually designated by a line segment associated with a preceding node. For instance,
X1,. . . , XN and Y1,. . . , YM are branches, as shown in Fig. 1. A complete ET
diagram draws all possible paths that represent a specific system. Each path con-
sists of a unique sequence of events, i.e., (XNY2Z1 . . . ) is one of the ET paths in Fig. 1.
The probability of each path in an ET diagram is evaluated for decision-making at
the systems design stage. These probabilities represent the likelihood of each outcome
or condition that can happen in a system. The assessment of these probabilities de-
pends upon the occurrence of previous events in an ET. The probability of each path is
usually computed by multiplying the probabilities of events associated with all nodes
in a path. For example, the probability of the path (XNY2Z1 . . . ) in Fig. 1 is expressed
mathematically as:
P(XNY2Z1 . . . ) = P(XN) ∗ P(Y2) ∗ P(Z1) ∗ . . . (1)
Also, all events in a path including the initiating node are assumed to be mutually
exclusive. This implies that the cumulative probability of all branches connected to a
certain node must be equal to 1 as:
N∑
i=1
P(Xi) = 1,
M∑
j=1
P(Yj) = 1,
K∑
h=1
P(Zh) = 1, . . . (2)
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Figure 1: A generic ET diagram
2.1 Theoretical Foundation
The underline mathematics of ET analysis in ETMA are mainly inspired from the
work of Papazoglou [8] that are briefly described as follows:
An event outcome space (W) is referred to as a list of all possible outcomes of an
event. Each node of an ET is associated with an event outcome space must satisfy
following constraints
1. Distinct : All outcomes in an event outcome space must be unique.
2. Disjoint (mutually exclusive): Any pair of events from a set of events outcome
space cannot occur at the same time.
3. Complete: An event outcome space must contain all possible events that can
occur.
4. Finite: An event outcome space must consists of a finite number of elements.
W = [ωj] j = 1, 2, . . . ,N (3)
Consider a system having two events, say E1 and E2, with two event outcome spaces
W1 and W2, respectively. The Cartesian product (
⊗
) of these event outcome spaces
returns a list of (N1×N2) pairs containing all possible outcome pairs for the occurrence
of E1 and E2 together (i.e., W1
⊗W2). In ET, the resulting event outcome space
from the Cartesian product of two event outcome spaces must also satisfy the above-
mentioned constraints. We program this concept in ETMA in two steps as follows:
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Step 1: We first construct a list of pairs by taking each element from the event
outcome spaces W1 and W2.
Step 2: We ensure that the obtained duets from Step 1 are mutually exclusive. For
instance, consider two arbitrary outcomes (ω1m ω2n) and (ω1k ω2l), at least (m 6= k) or
(n 6= l) must be true.
One of our main objectives, in this work, is to take an arbitrary list of given system
components with their operating states and automatically generate the corresponding
ET diagram (i.e., W1
⊗W2⊗ · · ·⊗WN ). For this purpose, we developed a Python
function in that can recursively perform Steps 1 and 2 on a given list of event outcome
spaces representing the system components and their operational states.
To present a clear understanding of the above-mentioned automatic ET generation
feature of ETMA, consider a system having three events, say E1, E2 and E3, with
three event outcome spaces W1, W2 and W3, respectively. The resulting ET diagram
is shown in Fig. 2 and the collection of all possible ET paths in a list of strings are as:
Path0 = [A1, B1, C1], Path1 = [A1, B1, C2],
Path2 = [A1, B2, C1], Path3 = [A1, B2, C2],
Path4 = [A2, B1, C1], Path5 = [A2, B1, C2],
Path6 = [A2, B2, C1], Path7 = [A2, B2, C2],
Path8 = [A3, B1, C1], Path9 = [A3, B1, C2],
Path10 = [A3, B2, C1], Path11 = [A3, B2, C2]
The order of the outcomes in a path is irrelevant when evaluating the probabilities
of a given path [11], i.e., the probability of path [A3, B1, C2] is P (A3) * P (B1)
* P (C2), which is exactly equivalent to the probability of path [C2, B1, A3] due to
the commutative property of multiplication. However, in many cases, it is useful to
preserve the order of outcomes in the ET paths. For instance, it can facilitate the
thinking process in certain critical situations, but it has no relation to the dynamic
of the system components [8]. Another benefit of introducing a sequence is that,
in some critical systems, if the main component fails, then the probability of this
path depends on the failure of the main component only without considering the next
components state. Therefore, we believe that a sequence preserving generation of ETs
must be adopted.
2.2 Branch or Node Deletion
During ET analysis, we may require to model the exact logical behavior of systems in
the sense that the irrelevant nodes and branches should be removed from a complete ET
of a system. This can be done by deleting some specific branch or nodes corresponding
to the occurrence of certain events, which are known as Complete Cylinders (CCs).
These cylinders are ET paths consisting of N events and they are conditional on the
occurrence of K events in their respective paths and not conditional on the occurrence
of the remaining (N - K) events [11]. These cylinders are also referred to as CCs with
respect to K Conditional Events (CEs).
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A reduced ET can be obtained in two ways: (1) eliminate certain branches with
all their successor nodes; and (2) delete only nodes from specific branches leaving the
successor nodes connected to these branches. The reduction process can be explained
as follows:
2.2.1 Branch Deletion
If the paths {8; 9; 10; 11}, shown in Fig. 2, are CCs with respect to the event A3 (i.e.,
not conditional on the occurrence of neither W2 nor W3 event outcome spaces), then
the branches [A3, B1] and [A3, B2] should be deleted. The resulting ET paths after
deletion are as follows:
Path0 = [A1, B1, C1], Path1 = [A1, B1, C2],
Path2 = [A1, B2, C1], Path3 = [A1, B2, C2],
Path4 = [A2, B1, C1], Path5 = [A2, B1, C2],
Path6 = [A2, B2, C1], Path7 = [A2, B2, C2],
Path8 = [A3]
2.2.2 Node Deletion
If the paths {0; 1; 2; 3}, shown in Fig. 2, are CCs with respect to the event A1 and
W3 event outcome space (i.e., not conditional on the occurrence of W2 event outcome
space only), then the node W2 from the branch A1 needs to be deleted only while
keeping the W3 event outcome space connected with the event A1. The resulting ET
paths after deletion are as follows:
Path0 = [A1, C1], Path1 = [A1, C2],
Path2 = [A2, B1, C1], Path3 = [A2, B1, C2],
Path4 = [A2, B2, C1], Path5 = [A2, B2, C2],
Path6 = [A3]
3 Event Tree Analysis in ETMA
The flowchart describing the ETMA tool for ETs modeling and analysis is depicted
in Fig. 3 and mainly consists of 4 steps as follows: (1) identify the given system
components and their operating states representing the behavior of the system, then
automatically generate a complete ET model describing all system components states
and also produce a complete outcome space with all possible scenarios of different
levels of failure and success; (2) optionally, reduce manually some nodes/branches
from the generated complete ET diagram to regenerate a smaller model exhibiting
the exact behavior of the given system; (3) partition the ET paths according to the
system components failure and success modes; and (4) evaluate the probability of
occurrence for certain events in the system after partitioning the ET paths.
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Figure 2: ET represents the event space outcomes
The details of the ETMA functions that perform the above-mentioned operations
are described in Algorithm 1. We provide pop-up input windows for each of these
functions in order to facilitate the users interaction with the ETMA tool. It can
be noticed from Algorithm 1 that the reduction ETMA feature can be bypassed, in
case the deletion of nodes or branches is not required. Also, to ensure that ETMA
is capable of generating complex and scalable ETs, we have implemented the steps
of Algorithm 1 using the PyGraphviz Python package [12], which provides several
methods for layout and drawing of complex graphs.
In reliability engineering, the decisions to add redundancy for critical components
or functions in a system are very crucial since it significantly increases the cost of the
system. Redundancy is often used in the form of a backup or fail-safe in order to
improve actual system performance. Decision tree [13], is a tree-like model that helps
safety engineers to conduct decision analysis and make effective decisions, like adding
redundancy to critical system components. Fig. 3 shows the procedure of making
a decision for redundancy of a critical component in a system. If the level of the
probabilistic analysis evaluated from the ET model is satisfied, then this component
is duplicated. If the results are not acceptable, then another critical component is
selected for redundancy from the system and ETMA is used for re-construct the new
ET model.
In the next section, we apply our algorithm and tool, which can be downloaded
from [14], on a real-world system for the domain of power protection and the results
of ETMA, in detail, are uploaded on the same above link.
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Algorithm 1 ETMA
1: procedure
2: S1: complete gen
3: Input: system name
4: system components
5: each system component states
6: Output: complete ET model
7: complete event outcome space
8: If Reduction of ET model needed?
9: then
10: S2: reduction process
11: Input: CCs identification
12: Output: reduced ET model
13: reduced event outcome space
14: S3: partitioning paths
15: Input: component event name(s)
16: ET path number(s)
17: Output: system events ET paths
18: S4: probability eval
19: Input: probabilities of components states
20: Output: Occurrence probability of an event
21: end procedure
4 Trip Circuit Analysis
Consider a trip circuit in a power grid system, which is used to isolate a specific
transmission line from the rest of a power grid, in case a fault occurs. The cascaded
failure for many transmission lines could lead to a blackout situation for the whole
grid, like what happened in San Diego in 2011 [15]. Therefore, a detailed ET analysis
of the trip circuit is essential.
The power grid consists of one generator, 9 circuit breakers (CB), 4 bus bars (BB),
2 transmission lines (TL), 2 loads, 2 (on step up and one step down) transformers
(Trans), 2 trip circuits (TC) with 1 relay (R) and 1 current transformer (CT), as
shown in Fig. 4. During normal operation, all CBs are in a closed position. If a fault
(F) occurs on TL1, a primary current (Ip) spike rises to about 20 times from a normal
current level. Then, the CT detects that there is a fault in TL1 and the secondary
current (Is) also rises with the same ratio simultaneously. Consequently, the relay coil
increases the magnetic field and attracts the relay contacts, which are connected to
the two separated trip circuits 1 and 2. Each trip circuit is provided with a battery.
So, when the relay contact closes, it becomes a closed loop. Finally, the magnetic field
produced by the trip coils 1 and 2 will push CB1 and CB2 to open and isolate TL1. If
all components of the trip circuit work correctly, then the fault becomes isolated and
the grid is safe. If not, then the grid is in a risk situation of a blackout and back-up
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Figure 4: Single line diagram of a trip circuit in a power grid
decisions should be made. In this paper, we study the ET-based probabilistic analysis
of all scenarios of failure and success that can occur in the trip circuit.
4.1 Event Tree Analysis
We start the ET analysis of the trip circuit in ETMA by first generating a complete
ET model. Then, we delete the unnecessary nodes and branches to obtain a reduced
ET that models the actual behavior of the trip circuit. Afterwards, we estimate the
probabilities of different events that can occur in the trip circuit, for instance, the
probability of both breakers CB1 and CB2 failing. Following are the steps required to
conduct the trip circuit ET analysis in ETMA:
Step 1 (Complete ET Generation):
We enter the details of the trip circuit components consisting of one CT , one R, two
TCs (TC1 and TC2) and two CBs (CB1 and CB2) and each having two operational
states, i.e., operating or failing, as shown in Fig. 5. However, we can assign different
levels of failure associated with each component. The entered details are sufficient for
ETMA’s function to automatically generate the complete graph ET model, see Fig. 6
for a snapshot of a portion of the complete ET. This model shows the whole possible
scenarios of failure and success for the trip circuit components states. ETMA also
automatically produces a complete event outcome space (64 paths from 0 to 63) from
the complete ET model as:
Path0 = [CTO, RO, TC1O, TC2O, CB1O, CB2O]
Path1 = [CTO, RO, TC1O, TC2O, CB1O, CB2F ]
...
Path62 = [CTF , RF , TC1F , TC2F , CB1F , CB2O]
Path63 = [CTF , RF , TC1F , TC2F , CB1F , CB2F ]
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Figure 5: ETMA: Trip circuit identification O (Operates) / F (Fails to operate)
Figure 6: ETMA: Trip circuit complete ET model
12
Table 1: Trip circuit ET complete cylinders
CCs ET Paths CEs
Type of
Deletion
CC1 32,. . . ,63 CTF Branch
CC2 16,. . . ,31 CTO, RF Branch
CC3 12,. . . ,15 CTO, RO, TC1F , TC2F Branch
CC4 8,. . . ,11 CTO, RO, TC1F , TC2O, CB2 Node (CB1)
CC5 4,. . . ,7 CTO, RO, TC1O, TC2F , CB1 Branch
Step 2 (ET Reduction Process):
If the user desires to take into consideration the complete ET model generated in
Step 1, then ETMA provides a bypassing option for Step 2 (i.e, ET reduction process).
Otherwise, the next step is to define the CCs and their CEs (Table 1) to model the ex-
act logical behavior of the trip circuit system. For instance, consider the paths from 32
to 63, if the CT fails then the likelihood or probability of occurrence of these paths are
equal to the probability of CT failure only, regardless of the status of other components
(i.e, the paths from 32 to 63 are CCs with respect to CTF ). So, in ETMA, we deleted
the branches [CTF , RO] and [CTF , RF ] from the complete ET (64 paths) in order to
model the exact logical behavior of the trip circuit, as shown in Fig. 7. The reduced
event outcome space (11 paths from 0 to 10) produced from the reduced ET model is as:
Path0 = [CTO, RO, TC1O, TC2O, CB1O, CB2O]
Path1 = [CTO, RO, TC1O, TC2O, CB1O, CB2F ]
Path2 = [CTO, RO, TC1O, TC2O, CB1F , CB2O]
Path3 = [CTO, RO, TC1O, TC2O, CB1F , CB2F ]
Path4 = [CTO, RO, TC1O, TC2F , CB1O]
Path5 = [CTO, RO, TC1O, TC2F , CB1F ]
Path6 = [CTO, RO, TC1F , TC2O, CB2O]
Path7 = [CTO, RO, TC1F , TC2O, CB2F ]
Path8 = [CTO, RO, TC1F , TC2F ]
Path9 = [CTO, RF ]
Path10 = [CTF ]
Step 3 (Partition Outcome Space):
The partitioning of the outcome space is essential as we are only interested in the
occurrence of certain events in an ET. Suppose, we are only focusing on the failure of
CB1, then paths 2, 3, and 5-10 are obtained. Similarly, different sets of paths can be
obtained by observing the behavior of the trip circuit components as:
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Figure 7: ETMA: Trip circuit reduced ET model
• P (CB1 Only Fails) =
∑P(2, 3, 5− 10)
• P (CB1 Only Operates) =
∑P(0, 1, 4)
• P (CB2 Only Fails) =
∑P(1, 3− 5, 7− 10)
• P (CB2 Only Operates) =
∑P(0, 2, 6)
• P (Both CB1 and CB2 Fail) =
∑P(3, 5, 7− 10)
• P (Both CB1 and CB2 Operate) =
∑P(0)
To the best of our knowledge this feature is not found in any other existing ET
analysis tool.
Step 4 (Probability Evaluation):
To estimate the probability of events associated with the trip circuit components, we
assign probability values to each operational state of the components, as shown in Ta-
ble 2. Assume that the times to failure of the trip circuit components are exponentially
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Table 2: Trip circuit probability of components states
Component
λ
(f/yr)
Prob. of Failure (%)
After 6 Months
Prob. of Success (%)
After 6 Months
CT 0.06 CTF (3%) CTO (97%)
R 0.04 RF (2%) RO (98%)
TC1 0.08 TC1F (4%) TC1O (96%)
TC2 0.08 TC2F (4%) TC2O (96%)
CB1 0.06 CB1F (3%) CB1O (97%)
CB2 0.06 CB2F (3%) CB2O (97%)
distribution with failure rate λ and time index t. Then the unreliability function or
the probability of failure can be computed as [16]:
F (t) = P(X ≤ t) = 1− e−λt (4)
where X is a time-to-failure random variable. Similarly, the reliability of a component
can be estimated by taking the complement of unreliability function with respect to
the probability space as [16]:
R(t) = P(X > t) = 1− F (t) (5)
The probabilities of the different trip circuit events, which are calculated using ETMA
are as follows:
P (Both CB1 and CB2 Fail) = 5.389960806400000%
P (Both CB1 and CB2 Operate) = 82.429704806399980%
P (CB1 Only Fails) = 11.480127999999999%
P (CB1 Only Operates) = 88.519871999999980%
P (CB2 Only Fails) = 11.480127999999999%
P (CB2 Only Operates) = 88.519871999999980%
It can be observed that the probability of both circuit breakers CB1 and CB2 failing
is evaluated as 5.389960806400000%. If we want to decrease their probability to 2.5%
or less, then we may add redundancy to these components. However, to ensure that
the redundancy to these components are a correct decision, we need to conduct the
decision analysis of the trip circuit, which is presented in the next section.
4.2 Decision Analysis
In the trip circuit, we can identify that the critical components are CT and R since
the failure of these components may cause overall trip circuit failure. A decision-tree
15
  
Desired Level 
of Probability 
Select CT 
Only
Select R 
Only 
YesNo
Desired Level 
of Probability 
No Yes
Redundant CT 
Redundant Both
CT and R 
Make New 
Component 
Selection
Desired Level 
of Probability 
Select Both 
CT and R 
No Yes
Redundant R 
Figure 8: Decision tree for the trip circuit
describing the process of selecting the redundancy for critical trip circuit components is
shown in Fig. 8. First, we select CT only for redundancy (i.e., adding CT2) assuming
the same probability of failure and success of CT1. If the probability of both circuit
breakers CB1 and CB2 failing together, after re-evaluation in ETMA, is equal to 2.5
% or less as required, then this is a correct decision. If not, then we select the critical
component R for redundancy. If we still do not achieve the desired level of probability,
then we select both CT and R together. If the results are not acceptable, then we
make a new component selection from the trip circuit. We use ETMA to generate
the new reduced ET model after adding redundant CT2 and obtain the following event
outcome space (31 paths only out of 128 complete paths):
Path0 = [CT1O, CT2O, RO, TC1O, TC2O, CB1O, CB2O]
Path1 = [CT1O, CT2O, RO, TC1O, TC2O, CB1O, CB2F ]
Path2 = [CT1O, CT2O, RO, TC1O, TC2O, CB1F , CB2O]
Path3 = [CT1O, CT2O, RO, TC1O, TC2O, CB1F , CB2F ]
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Path4 = [CT1O, CT2O, RO, TC1O, TC2F , CB1O]
Path5 = [CT1O, CT2O, RO, TC1O, TC2F , CB1F ]
Path6 = [CT1O, CT2O, RO, TC1F , TC2O, CB2O]
Path7 = [CT1O, CT2O, RO, TC1F , TC2O, CB2F ]
Path8 = [CT1O, CT2O, RO, TC1F , TC2F ]
Path9 = [CT1O, CT2O, RF ]
Path10 = [CT1O, CT2F , RO, TC1O, TC2O, CB1O, CB2O]
Path11 = [CT1O, CT2F , RO, TC1O, TC2O, CB1O, CB2F ]
Path12 = [CT1O, CT2F , RO, TC1O, TC2O, CB1F , CB2O]
Path13 = [CT1O, CT2F , RO, TC1O, TC2O, CB1F , CB2F ]
Path14 = [CT1O, CT2F , RO, TC1O, TC2F , CB1O]
Path15 = [CT1O, CT2F , RO, TC1O, TC2F , CB1F ]
Path16 = [CT1O, CT2F , RO, TC1F , TC2O, CB2O]
Path17 = [CT1O, CT2F , RO, TC1F , TC2O, CB2F ]
Path18 = [CT1O, CT2F , RO, TC1F , TC2F ]
Path19 = [CT1O, CT2F , RF ]
Path20 = [CT1F , CT2O, RO, TC1O, TC2O, CB1O, CB2O]
Path21 = [CT1F , CT2O, RO, TC1O, TC2O, CB1O, CB2F ]
Path22 = [CT1F , CT2O, RO, TC1O, TC2O, CB1F , CB2O]
Path23 = [CT1F , CT2O, RO, TC1O, TC2O, CB1F , CB2F ]
Path24 = [CT1F , CT2O, RO, TC1O, TC2F , CB1O]
Path25 = [CT1F , CT2O, RO, TC1O, TC2F , CB1F ]
Path26 = [CT1F , CT2O, RO, TC1F , TC2O, CB2O]
Path27 = [CT1F , CT2O, RO, TC1F , TC2O, CB2F ]
Path28 = [CT1F , CT2O, RO, TC1F , TC2F ]
Path29 = [CT1F , CT2O, RF ]
Path30 = [CT1F , CT2F ]
The new probabilities values evaluated using ETMA describing the occurrence of
failure and success in the trip circuit components are as follows:
P (Both CB1 and CB2 Fail) = 2.255165963059199%
P (Both CB1 and CB2 Operate) = 84.902595950591990%
P (CB1 Only Fails) = 8.824531840000000%
P (CB1 Only Operates) = 91.175468160000000%
P (CB2 Only Fails) = 8.824531840000000%
P (CB2 Only Operates) = 91.175468160000000%
By comparing these values with those in Section 4 (Step 4), we can clearly observe
that the trip circuit performance has been improved. Fig. 9 shows the comparison
among these values in a histogram plot. It can be seen that the probability percentage
of the circuit breakers CB1 and CB2 failing together is decreased from 5.38996% to
2.25517% by an amount of 3.13479%. Similarly, the proportion of the circuit breakers
CB1 and CB2 succeeding together is also increased from 82.42970% to 84.90259% with
an increment of 2.47289%.
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Figure 9: Trip circuit events probabilities evaluation
5 Comparison with Isograph
To ensure the accuracy of the ETMA computation, we compare the trip circuit
analysis results with the commercial Isograph ET analysis tool [6]. We analyze the trip
circuit without any redundancy in the critical components using Isograph. It is im-
portant to mention that, unlike ETMA, Isograph requires from the users to manually
draw the trip circuit actual ET model (ETMA Step 2) and assign the probability to
each event as shown in Fig. 10. Since the partitioning process of the ET paths is not
available in Isograph, we used the manual calculation of the paths probabilities that
represent the occurrence of the the trip circuit events. The comparison in the proba-
bilistic analysis of the trip circuit between ETMA and Isograph is presented in Table 3.
It can be observed that the probabilities obtained from ETMA are approximately
equivalent to the corresponding ones calculated using Isograph. This clearly demon-
strates that ETMA is not only providing the correct results but also a complete ET
analysis compared to existing ET analysis tools. Moreover, the CPU time for the trip
circuit step-wise ET analysis in ETMA is much faster than Isograph, as shown in
Table 4. The experiments were performed on a single-core i5, 2.20 GHz, Linux VM
with 1 GB of RAM device. Also, ETMA is providing several additional features, in-
cluding the automation of complete ET generation and the partitioning of ET paths
for events probabilistic analysis, that are not available in any other existing reliability
analysis tool. All these features of ETMA are extremely useful for safety analysts and
reliability engineers to quantify system improvements with fast and accurate decisions.
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Figure 10: Isograph: Trip circuit ET model
Table 3: Comparison between ETMA and Isograph
Trip Circuit
Events
% Prob.
from
Isograph
% Prob.
from
ETMA
Both CB1 and CB2 Fail 5.38996 % 5.389960806400000 %
Both CB1 and CB2 Operate 82.43 % 82.429704806399980 %
CB1 Only Fails 11.48 % 11.480127999999999 %
CB1 Only Operates 88.52 % 88.519871999999980 %
CB2 Only Fails 11.48 % 11.480127999999999 %
CB2 Only Operates 88.52 % 88.519871999999980 %
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Table 4: ETMA: Trip circuit CPU time
Steps
CPU
Time
ETMA
(Seconds)
CPU
Time
Isograph
(Seconds) Steps
CPU
Time
ETMA
(Seconds)
CPU
Time
Isograph
(Seconds)
Step 1 0.291600 NA Step 3 0.000631 NA
Step 2 0.000162 NA Step 4 0.004319 2.752
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed a new event trees modeling and analysis tool, called ETMA,
using list data-structure in Python. ETMA provides several features to model any
generic, complete and sequential ET diagram consisting of a large number of system
components. Also, ETMA provides deleting/reducing features to remove irrelevant
specific nodes or paths from a complete ET diagram to model the exact logical be-
havior of the given system. Moreover, ETMA provides partitioning of ETs paths and
probabilistic analysis of the occurrence of a certain event. For illustration purposes, we
conducted the ET modeling and analysis of the trip circuit in the power grid transmis-
sion lines. The results of ETMA were used for making redundancy decisions about
the critical components in the trip circuit. We also compared the results obtained in
ETMA with those from the Isograph tool, which is commonly used for ET analysis.
We plan to extend our ETMA tool with additional features for safety assessment [17],
reliability analysis [18] and machine learning [19].
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